Culture as Class Symbolization or Mass Reification? A Critique of Bourdieu's Distinction'
David Gartman University of South Alabama Pierre Bourdieu's theory of culture as a system of symbols furthering a misrecognition of class is critically compared to the Frankfurt school's theory of culture as reifying commodities furthering an unrecognition of class. Because of their approaches to history, both theories recognize only part of the complex reality of modern capitalist culture. Bourdieu's ahistorical structuralism fails to grasp the historical changes produced in culture by capitalism, while critical theory's essentialism fails to specify the concrete factors mediating the historical effects of capitalism on culture. As a corrective to both, a neo-Marxist theory is developed that grasps the totality of capitalist culture by grounding the effects of class on culture in concrete, historical class struggle.
The main theme of the voluminous and multifaceted sociological corpus of Pierre Bourdieu is the reintegration of the economic and cultural dimensions of society. Unlike many if not most sociologists, who reduce one dimension to the other, Bourdieu argues that culture and economy are intricately related in a web of mutual constitution. The class distinctions of the economy inevitably generate the symbolic distinctions of culture, which in turn regenerate and legitimate the class structure. Taking his cues largely from Weber, Bourdieu reveals class and status to be inextricably related dimensions of social life.
This project has culminated in Bourdieu's (1984) "big book," entitled Distinction. The results are impressive, both in theoretical conceptualization and empirical verification. Not since the Frankfurt school's efforts has there been such a serious attempt to reveal how culture and consumption contribute to the reproduction of the class system of modern society. system of durable dispositions that is socially conditioned by the objective structure of society. In the process of socialization, people in different class positions are exposed to different "material conditions of existence," which give rise to characteristic ways of perceiving and being in the world. This deeply rooted habitus gives rise to all specific tastes in food, clothing, art, and so on. The habitus is thus a generative structure that provides the unifying principle of the specific practices in different cultural fields. But it is a social structure-the class structure so deeply embodied in individual dispositions that they appear natural and obscure their social origins (Bourdieu 1977 , pp. 72-97).
The class structure of society becomes embodied in these habitus by determining the exposure of individuals to different material conditions of existence. Classes, Bourdieu states, are defined by different levels and types of capital, both economic and cultural. Individuals with little capital are continually exposed to material scarcities and the consequent economic necessity of making a living, while those with greater capital share an objective distance from the material urgencies of life. The distance from economic necessity conditions different class habitus, which in turn generate different cultural tastes (Bourdieu 1984 , pp. 53-56, 169-75).
In Distinction, Bourdieu distinguishes three broad classes, each of which is unified by similar tastes and life-styles: the bourgeoisie, the petite bourgeoisie, and the working class (peasants and industrial workers). The bourgeois class possesses a high volume of capital, which distances it from the economic necessities of life. These material conditions engender a "taste for freedom," a preference for cultural objects and practices that are removed from mundane material functions. This bourgeois taste engenders an "aesthetic disposition," a propensity to stylize and formalize natural functions in order to lift them above mundane materiality and, in so doing, display their distance from this realm of necessity (Bourdieu 1984, pp. 18-63).
The bourgeois taste for freedom is defined in opposition to the working-class taste for necessity, which serves as a mere foil in the game of distinction. Having little capital, peasants and industrial workers must of necessity be constantly concerned with the practicalities of material existence. But Bourdieu contends that this economic necessity becomes ingrained as a taste, an actual choice or preference for things that are functional, natural, unformalized, and sensual. Bourdieu paints workers as down-to-earth creatures who reduce practices to their functions and are unconcerned about games of distinction (Bourdieu 1984, pp. 372-96) .
Between these two main systems of class tastes is the petite bourgeoisie-those of moderate capital distinguished by their taste for pretension. The petite bourgeoisie aspires to bourgeois distinction but has neither the capital nor habitus to really achieve it. Hence, these upstarts seek to superficially adopt a life-style not their own, to become something they are not by borrowing the outward signs of legitimate culture (Bourdieu 1984 , pp. 318-71).
Bourdieu holds that the value society assigns each of these distinct class cultures is strictly arbitrary and determined solely by power. The dominant class is able to impose its life-style as the legitimate standard of judgment by sheer force, or "symbolic violence" ( Bourdieu (1985b, 1988/89) forcefully denies any similarity of his ideas to the theory of conspicuous consumption. What he objects to most is Veblen's conception of consumption as a rational choice of certain goods and life-styles in the pursuit of distinction. In his theory distinctive conduct "has nothing to do with rational choice," since it is the product of a habitus, a practical sense that is not consciously formulated or chosen (Bourdieu 1988 analysis of reified culture to modern consumer capitalism, in which the production of cultural goods is taken over by large, concentrated industries whose sole motive is profits. As a result, culture becomes a commodity, whose production and distribution is subordinated to the technological rationality of domination in the factory and the marketplace. The culture industry produces art, music, and literature as commodities, subjecting them to the standardization and homogenization of mass production. In the process, all critical distinctions and disturbing connotations are eradicated from cultural commodities, so that they are palatable to the broadest possible market. This mass culture is offered to consumers as a compensation, a substitute satisfaction for the needs denied them as degraded and alienated producers in capitalism. And because all classes participate in this mass culture, albeit unequally, ostensible class differences are leveled by the consumption of its standardized commodities. Real qualitative differences in class power take on the appearance of merely quantitative differences in the possession of the same goods (Horkheimer Adorno argues that the cultural preferences of these strata are actually created by the manipulative marketing strategies of the culture industry. In order to hawk more wares, markets are divided and subdivided by social variables in market research, and products are differentiated and stratified to appeal to these niches. But these product distinctions, which lend cultural goods a pseudoindividuality to placate the need for real individuality denied in production, are in reality superficial differentiations of fundamentally similar goods. They do not correspond to but conceal class differences (Horkheimer and Adorno 1972, pp. 121-24, 154-56).
The differentiation offered consumers by the culture industry is superficial not only because its products are in reality produced in a standardized production process but also because they are consumed in a standardized process that cuts across all social categories. Bourdieu (1984, p. 100) sustains his theory of class cultures by holding that even when objectively identical products are consumed by different classes, they are appropriated and perceived differentially according to their respective habitus. By contrast, Frankfurt theorists support their theory of mass culture by arguing that even when objectively different products are consumed by different classes, they are appropriated similarly, thus leveling any cultural differences between classes. Bourdieu explicitly offers (1984, p. 588) what he thinks is a devastating criticism of Adorno's analysis of popular music by showing that legitimate music is also repetitive and passively consumed. But that is precisely the point of Adorno's (1978) critique of music that is dominated by the culture industry. Despite the ostensible differences in content, both popular and classical music are consumed in the same fetishistic form, in which the popularity or market success of the composition is valued over its intrinsic worth as art. In material products like automobiles, such consumption focuses not on the intrinsic quality of the mechanism but the fetish of the trademark, which testifies to the car's standing in the artificial prestige hierarchy. Such consumption offers people ersatz satisfaction of their unfulfilled needs and conceals the real differences in class power beneath a mass of artificially differentiated commodities.
The Frankfurt school's theory of mass culture has been justly criticized for certain weaknesses. Bourdieu (1984, p. 386) correctly points out that critical theorists often commit the short-circuit fallacy-establishing a direct, unmediated link between economic structure and cultural practices. They do not make explicit how and why the reified, class-obscuring logic of capitalism infiltrates and dominates culture. The implicit answers are rather functionalist and essentialist. The capitalist system requires a mass culture that hides class divisions to reproduce itself, so it emerges. This functionalism often degenerates into crude instrumentalism, in which omnipotent elites consciously manipulate culture to perpetuate the domination of the masses, who passively accept whatever is foisted on them (Kellner 1984-85; Miller 1987) .
Despite these problems I think that critical theory's conception of a mass culture that obscures class differences is a powerful and indispensable tool for understanding the legitimating role of culture in late capitalism. But it should be conceptualized as a complement, not as an alternative, to Bourdieu's conception of a culture of class symbolization. Both theories capture part of the cultural reality of late capitalism but err in generalizing from this part to the cultural whole.
CLASS CULTURE OR MASS CULTURE: EMPIRICAL ARGUMENTS
There is good empirical evidence from a variety of sources to at least partially validate Bourdieu's idea of culture as symbolizing class differences as well as the Frankfurt school's notion of a mass culture obscuring class differences. Although this evidence may seem at first contradictory or at least inconsistent, a close examination reveals that it is drawn from different parts of the cultural reality of late capitalism.
In order to bring empirical data to bear on this debate, we first need to clarify the exact nature of the disagreement between Bourdieu and the Frankfurt theorists. Both theories postulate differences of attitudes and outlooks between classes. There is ample empirical evidence that documents these subjective differences generated by class position, most of it consistent with Bourdieu's characterization of class habitus.2 The two theories differ, however, on how and whether subjective class differences are objectified in cultural consumption and life-style. Bourdieu argues that class differences produce visible cultural differences in all fields, but because these cultural differences are mistakenly perceived as originating in individual worthiness rather than class position, they end up legitimating the class system. The Frankfurt theorists contend that subjective class differences are obscured by the objective homogeneity of mass culture, which legitimates the class system by making its real differences invisible.
Bourdieu offers a great deal of empirical data from his and others' surveys that purport to reveal objective differences in cultural consumption between the classes. But upon close examination these data do not unequivocally support the broad theoretical generalizations of the text. The evidence for class differences is systematically stronger in fields of nonmaterial culture like visual art, music, and literature than in fields of material culture like food, clothing, and furniture. Thus, for example, in the field of music, class is clearly and strongly associated with knowledge of and preference for legitimate or classical music. When asked which musical compositions they preferred, 1% of the working class chose the legitimate works, as opposed to around 30% of the upper class. And when asked to identify the composers of 16 classical works, none of the manual or clerical workers but over 20% of the upper class named more than 12 (Bourdieu 1984, pp. 15, 64). In the field of visual art, the upper class displayed its formal aesthetic by stating much more frequently than the working class (20% and 6%, respectively) that an object socially designated as meaningless, like a cabbage, could make a beautiful painting. The working class revealed its functionalist aesthetic by stating a greater preference than the upper class (88% compared to about 60%) for superficially pretty subjects like a sunset over the sea (Bourdieu 1984 The data do not, however, seem sufficiently strong to support Bourdieu's contention that class life-styles are sharply segmented and insular. There appear to be no rigid class boundaries between popular culture and high culture. Although the upper class clearly has more knowledge of and participation in high culture, research has also shown consistently that its members also participate in the popular culture, often at levels commensurate with the lower classes. For example, in his study of the cultural activities of American men, Wilensky (1964) found that while the more educated spent more time consuming high culture than the less educated, they spent a great deal more time absorbing popular culture. DiMaggio and Useem (1978a) found that the well educated and persons of high occupational prestige did and liked more of almost all culture. Bourdieu's own data seem to reflect the existence of this mass culture, in which all classes participate, alongside the high culture dominated by the upper class. For example, although a much larger proportion of the upper class (20%) stated that a cabbage could make a beautiful painting than did the working class (5%), a majority of all classes stated that a sunset over the sea made a beautiful painting. And while the upper class expressed a greater preference for legitimate music than the working class, a substantial proportion of all classes expressed a preference for popular music (Bourdieu 1984 , pp. 64, 37-38).
The existence of a common, mass culture seems even more prominent in the area of material culture. While Bourdieu claims that class habitus dictate the consumption of different types of physical products, his data belie this generalization and indicate class differences significantly smaller than those revealed in nonmaterial culture. In the field of food, for example, Bourdieu claims that the working-class taste for necessity dictates foods that are fatty and heavy, while the bourgeois taste for freedom dictates lighter, leaner foods. Yet data on the distribution of expenditures among the various food categories are surprisingly similar across classes. Manual workers spent 2.4% of their food budget on fresh fruit, while senior executives spent 3.1%; on fats, workers 5.3%, executives 4.3%; on beef, 8.1% versus 9.8%; on fresh vegetables, 5.4% versus 5.5%; on cereals, 8.9% versus 7.5% (Bourdieu 1984, pp. 181-82, 188-89). We are told that the working-class meal stresses informality and abundance, while the bourgeois meal stresses formality and ceremony. But the data presented reveal that differences between the classes are small. Even when entertaining guests, the majority of all classes preferred to offer guests a full meal rather than a buffet, liked their guests to dress casually rather than elegantly, and preferred for guests to choose their own places rather than designating places. And while working-class people answered more frequently than the middle or upper class that the most important aspect of spontaneous entertaining was having enough to eat (34%, 28%, and 26%, respectively) nearly an identical proportion of workers (33 %) answered that it was important that guests not be bored (Bourdieu 1984, pp. 198-99) .
In the field of domestic furnishings, Bourdieu tells the reader that the working-class taste for necessity is expressed in the preference for homes that are clean and practical, while the bourgeois taste for freedom imbues preference for the studied and imaginative interior. The data reveal that higher occupational groups did describe the ideal domestic interior as "imaginative" and "studied" more often than the lower groups, who were more likely to mention "clean" and "practical" in their descriptions. But the adjectives most frequently used by nearly all groups, high and low, were "comfortable" and "cozy" (Bourdieu 1984, pp. 247-48) .
A recent ethnography of blue-collar workers lends credence to this notion that a mass culture shared by all classes and centered largely on material commodities exists alongside a high culture dominated by the upper class and focused on nonmaterial arts. In his study of chemical workers in one New Jersey refinery, David Halle (1984) found that their distinctive position at work led to subjective attitudes and beliefs that were clearly different from white-collar employees. The blue-collar workers were generally dissatisfied with their work and resentful of their immediate bosses and corporate power in general. They held few aspirations for individual advancement but pinned their hopes for the future on collectively won gains in wages and benefits.3 So on the job Halle's workers saw themselves as "working men" and, with a certain amount of class consciousness, marked themselves off from white-collar employees and managers. But outside of work these subjective attitudes were not objectified in a distinctive class style of cultural consumption. These well-paid blue-collar workers led leisure lives rather similar to whitecollar employees, for their overlapping incomes allowed them to purchase similar goods and services. Halle (1984, Bourdieu's Distinction tions because each group has its own producers. The competitive struggles between producers in the marketplace lead each to produce a distinct product. And each supply finds a matching demand, not because producers come from the same class as their consumers but because producers' positions in the field of production-rearguard versus avant-garde, established versus outsider-are homologous to class positions consumers occupy in the field of consumption (Bourdieu 1984, pp. 230-34; 1983, pp.  325-26; 1986, pp. 138-49) .
But this generalization is certainly not true of the automobile, which Bourdieu uses to exemplify his theory (1984, pp. 128-29, 278-79, 548-51). Bourdieu's theory assumes a highly competitive market in which numerous producers jockey to find consumers, but the market for American automobiles, like many other material commodities, is unquestionably oligopolistic. The handful of huge corporations that dominate production do not specialize in one market niche but offer a wide range of products that blankets all markets, from the cheapest to the most expensive. And the different automobile models offered by each oligopolistic corporation cannot appeal to specific class tastes because they are all designed by the same designers. Typically, the automobile designers of a corporation are not responsible to one of its several model-producing divisions but are grouped in a staff department directly responsible to top corporate managers. Often working in a separate center geographically and organizationally removed from divisional managers, this design staff is responsible for the aesthetics of the entire range of corporate products, from the cheapest to the most expensive. Although there is often a separate studio for each division, this separation exists not to create products that differ fundamentally in aesthetics to appeal to different class tastes but to superficially differentiate the few structural foundations from which all corporate cars are produced. The different automotive nameplates of each corporation generally share the same few body shells, which are given distinct divisional identities by the addition of largely superficial details: headlights, taillights, grilles, fenders.
The empirical facts of automobile design reveal that these artificially differentiated models do not and cannot appeal to a variety of distinct class tastes. If this were the aim, design personnel would have to be rigidly specialized by division, spending their entire careers cultivating a specific class style. But in most corporations designers are juggled around constantly. And independent designers who contract with corporations also design a variety of automobiles across the entire price spectrum. What is more, my interviews with auto designers reveal that they do not apply different aesthetic standards to different lines of autos. They try to accomplish the same basic look in all lines. For example, economy cars that sell to lower-income groups are not designed specifically to American Journal of Sociology appeal to their inherent "functionalist aesthetic." Designers know that no one wants a car that looks cheap, that screams stripped-down functionality. So they attempt to make economy cars look as much like their expensive corporate relatives as is possible within the cost restraints given them and while maintaining the separate identities of the lines. The quantity of features and embellishments on the various makes in the automobile hierarchy are varied by designers to justify the price differences. But the quality of aesthetics is basically the same across the hierarchy, so the graded models cannot testify to distinct class tastes. More expensive cars offer those with more money to spend not qualitatively different aesthetics to testify to superior taste but merely more of what everyone has a taste for.
Empirical evidence on automobiles and other artifacts of material culture is more compatible with the Frankfurt school's arguments that modern culture legitimates class by obscuring rather than symbolizing class differences. The qualitative hierarchy of class power is obscured by a quantitative hierarchy of material consumption in which people are differentiated by the income rewards of a seemingly equitable market.
Hierarchies of material products like autos ideologically transform the contradiction of class power into a continuum of consumption, in which position is legitimated not by inborn taste but by individual market efforts, as surveys routinely reveal (Coleman and Rainwater 1978, pp. 24-33, 241; Goldthorpe et al. 1969, pp. 146-56).

HISTORY, CLASS, AND CULTURE
The empirical evidence shows that there is a partial truth in the theories of both Bourdieu and the Frankfurt school. While the material culture of consumer commodities in late capitalist societies seems to obscure the differences between classes, the nonmaterial culture, especially the high arts, demonstrates distinct cleavages that symbolize classes. I believe the partial vision of each is explained by their respective approaches to historical development. Bourdieu's basically ahistorical theory projects onto capitalism a model of class and culture derived from a precapitalist past and thus fails to capture the cultural dynamics introduced by the specific class relations of capitalism. The Frankfurt school's essentialist theory overgeneralizes the historical trends introduced into culture by capitalist commodity relations and thus fails to recognize the persistence of certain precapitalist cultural relations. I propose to correct both theories by a neo-Marxist approach to culture that focuses on the mediating factor of historical class struggle.
Bourdieu ( With the coming of industrial capitalism, however, the market institutionalizes economic capital, making it objective and impersonal. Industrialization also renders cultural capital autonomous from economic capital. The increasing income and education of the dominated classes creates a large, culture-consuming public and, consequently, cultural institutions independent of the dominant-class. Producers in this field of masscultural production serving the lower classes are motivated by economic profit to seek the largest possible rnarket and hence reduce standards to the lowest common denominator. Alongside them, however, emerges a separate field of restricted production, where cultural goods are produced for other culture-goods producers in the pursuit of symbolic profit through adherence to disinterested aesthetic standards (Bourdieu 1985a, pp. 14-33; 1983, pp. 319-22).
Bourdieu contends that in early capitalism the economic and cultural fields remain separate. The objective mechanism of the market itself hides inequalities of economic capital, so there is no need for a symbolic veil of misrecognition. But this early stage ends when, as Bourdieu vaguely states, the ideological effects of the market are "uncovered and neutralized." Consequently, legitimation of class domination requires a return to cultural misrecognition of economic capital through its conversion into symbolic capital (Bourdieu 1977, p. 196 ). This is accomplished by the bourgeois consumption of the cultural products of the field of restricted production, to which their habitus naturally inclines them. Such consumption not only distinguishes the bourgeoisie from the working class but also consecrates it with the air of disinterestedness and personal worthiness that accompanies this cultural realm autonomous from the economic market (Bourdieu 1983, pp. 324-25, 335-37; 1985a,  pp. 22, 3 1-32 ). So after a brief separation of economic and cultural capital in early capitalism, once again the two are integrated in a system of legitimation in which class power is misrecognized as individual gifted-ness or charisma. Bourdieu's history of class ideologies is not really much of a history at all, but the story of an eternally occurring relation that changes only in form.
This essentially ahistorical formulation fails to recognize the historical specificity of the culture of capitalism and the relations of production on which it is based. Bourdieu generalizes the peculiarly precapitalist ideology of charisma into capitalist societies. Following Weber, he uses the concept to denote a system of beliefs that legitimates differences in power by reference to the intrinsic qualities of individuals displayed in distinctive life-styles. But Weber confines charismatic authority mainly to precapitalist societies, in which personal power relations require ideologies that justify the person as superior. He argues (1968, pp. 241-54) that the rationalization process brings the impersonal rule of economic and political bureaucracies, in which authority is justified by the rationality of the structure, not the worthiness of individuals.
Bourdieu ignores this change in the nature of cultural legitimation largely due to his conceptualization of class, which rejects the Marxist emphasis on positions in production in favor of a Weberian emphasis on positions in the distribution of goods.5 He defines class as a structural position in a distributional space of two resources: economic capital and cultural capital. An individual's combined returns from these two fields determine his or her class position. In modern societies, primary class differences are determined by the overall volume of combined capital, with secondary differences (class fractions) derived from the relative proportion of the two different capitals held (Bourdieu 1984 Bourdieu's analysis of class as position in economic distribution fails to capture the historical changes in economic production that condition culture. Because the distribution of resources remains similarly unequal across capitalist and precapitalist societies, he postulates class cultures that similarly symbolize this inequality. Marxism's focus on class as relations of production makes it potentially more cognizant of historical changes induced in culture. For Marxists, the distribution of market incomes in capitalism is epiphenomenal, the surface appearance determined by the relations between classes in production. At this level exists the more fundamental inequality of power to control the process of social labor.
The Frankfurt theorists of mass culture focus on this Marxist conception of class inequality to explain the historically variant forms of cultural legitimation. Following Marx (1977, pp. 170-71) and Lukacs (1971, pp. 83-110), they argue that the relations of labor control in precapitalist societies are direct and personal. Precapitalist culture bears the marks of these direct relations of subordination, for it is obviously the exclusive preserve of the dominant classes who alone have the power and resources to cultivate and appropriate nonessential goods. However, with the rise of capitalism the relations of power in production become indirect, with workers subordinated to capitalists through the impersonal exchange of labor power for wages. Thus, class relations become reified, appearing not as human power relations but as relations between things exchanged in the market. With Lukacs, critical theorists argue that the reified relations of production are extended to culture as it becomes produced by large-scale, commercial enterprises. Mass production reduces the distinctions of cultural products, thus hiding the real differences in class power behind a facade of standardized things consumed by all.
While their historical focus on changing forms of class domination in production makes critical theorists more cognizant of changing forms of class legitimation, their use of history is flawed by its essentialism. Heavily influenced by Hegel, the Frankfurt school gives us a history of class and culture that reads like the unfolding of an essence inherent in capitalism. The concrete, mediating mechanisms that account for the spread of economic reification into the cultural realm are not specified, as Bourdieu points out. This essentialist inattention to historical mediations leads critical theory to ignore the differential effects of reification on culture.
Bourdieu There is contest and struggle in Bourdieu's theory. He postulates that people are incessantly, but not necessarily rationally, pursuing strategies to optimize the returns from their capital within a given field. But these struggles take place solely within the predetermined confines of the field and rarely challenge the rules of the game themselves (DiMaggio 1979, p. 1470). Class conflict in Bourdieu never seems to contradict or change the class structure because it is largely limited to intraclass struggle within the bourgeoisie. He confines his attention almost exclusively to the struggle for power between the dominant and the dominated fractions of the Bourdieu's Distinction bourgeoisie and the struggle for symbolic capital within the latter (Bourdieu 1983, pp. 319-26). This intraclass strife never fundamentally challenges the class structure of capitalism, since all bourgeois fractions have an interest in their joint domination of the working class.
Bourgeois struggles for symbolic capital within fields of restricted cultural production do often transform these fields and lead to changes in literature, education, and art. Historic shifts in the relative scarcity of resources within fields disrupt the equilibrium established between the objective opportunities for success within it and the subjective expectations (habitus) of individual participants. Such disruptions give rise to cultural struggles between established and parvenu cultural fractions that change a field. In Homo Academicus (1988), for example, Bourdieu argues that in the field of education the increase in the number of students and teachers in the 1960s caused a devaluation of their credentials on the job market. This, in turn, produced a discrepancy between the career expectations they internalized under the previous structure and the objective opportunities credentials afforded in the changed structure of the field. The result of this discrepancy was the revolt in the universities culminating in May 1968.
Such challenges to established bourgeois cultural authorities often find resonance within the dominated class due to its homologous position of exclusion and domination. In the May 1968 revolt, for example, upstart students and teachers found temporary support among industrial workers, who were similarly degraded by established educational authorities. However, the course of events usually reveals that bourgeois intellectual challengers have no interest in eliminating cultural authority per se, but merely securing a greater share for themselves. So interclass alliances ultimately dissolve, and temporary "breaks in equilibrium" are restored to the field as the transformed structure of opportunities is internalized in agents (Bourdieu 1988 , pp. 156, 167) . So, for Bourdieu, cultural changes are caused not by fundamental struggles between classes with inherently divergent interests but by shifts in resources between individuals and class fractions maneuvering in cultural markets to monopolize symbolic capital. He depicts the dominated class of capitalism as almost completely passive and powerless. Workers actually have a taste for the cultural practices and goods forced upon them by their subordinate class position. In contrast to the bourgeois taste for freedom, the working class has a taste for necessity, for undisguised objects and practices that do not seek to hide their relations to animal functions. Workers have so thoroughly internalized their own domination that they must rely on the symbolic tools supplied externally by bourgeois intellectuals to organize and express their interests. But because these tools are bourgeois in origin, they are limited in their chal- Bourdieu's conception of the working class is at once degrading and exalting. He degrades it to the level of an unreflective, animal existence. Workers are "natural" creatures who, because they are reduced to sheer physical labor by the class system, develop a taste for base and animal pleasures (Bourdieu 1984 In contrast to Bourdieu's structuralist theory of culture as a reproducing structure, the critical theory of culture as reification is based upon a conception of culture as praxis, a struggle to realize inherent human needs that may fundamentally transform as well as reproduce class structure. For critical theorists, especially Herbert Marcuse, cultural action may contradict and change the social structures in which it is exercised because it has an ontological basis in human needs that are transhistorical. They follow the early Marx in postulating that human beings are by nature active, self-creating creatures whose consciousness gives them the potential for self-determination, activity free from necessity. The historical mode of production constrains and limits the realization of this potential, but it can never totally suppress the natural desire for freedom. While Bourdieu postulates the pursuit of freedom to be a structurally conditioned taste characteristic of the dominant class alone, critical theory holds that the praxis of all people is underwritten by a basic desire for freedom (Marx 1964; Marcuse 1966) .
For critical theorists, culture is a realm of praxis that expresses these transhistorical needs and cannot be simply reduced to the social function of reproducing the class structure, as Bourdieu seeks to do. Historically, culture serves a utopian function-it is the expression of the need for freedom that is denied by the class organization of society. While this utopian function can help to maintain the society by providing a safety valve for discontent, it also retains in the collective consciousness the longing for fulfillments which the existing society cannot provide. Consequently, culture always has a negative component that cannot be totally subordinated to the reproduction of the system. Although modern, reified mass culture exhibits a tendency to eliminate this critical component, even it exhibits utopian strivings for self-determination that cannot be completely absorbed by the class system (Aronowitz 1981; Adorno 198 la; Horkheimer and Adorno 1972; Jameson 1979 Jameson , 1983 Marcuse 1964 Marcuse , 1966 Marcuse , 1969 Marcuse , 1978 .
The weakness in the Frankfurt school's formulation of culture as human praxis to realize freedom is that it is historically underdetermined. Critical theorists tell us little about the specific historical conditions under which cultural praxis becomes either ideological or revolutionary. But this weakness can be corrected by replacing this vague, socially dislocated and historically unspecified praxis by concrete, historical class struggle. The crucial mediating factor that determines the effect of the class structure of a society on its cultural productions is neither Bourdieu's inexorably reproducing habitus or critical theory's dislocated praxis but the socially located, historically specific conflict of dominant and dominated classes. Such an approach is embodied in the pioneering work of Georg Lukacs.
In several places, Bourdieu (1983, p. 336; as quoted in Wacquant 1989, pp. 33-34) includes Lukaics in his criticism of Lucien Goldmann and other Marxist literary critics for their short-circuit fallacy-that is, making direct and naive connections between the class positions of writers and their cultural productions. Although this fallacy may be characteristic of Goldmann and some Frankfurt theorists, it is not revelant to Lukacs, who does not reduce the form or content of a cultural production to the class position of its producer. If truly guilty of such a simplistic reductionism, he would have no grounds for praising the works of some bourgeois writers over others or for condemning the productions of some proletarian writers (Lukaics 1973a (Lukaics , 1973b (Lukaics , 1962 (Lukaics , 1980a (Lukaics , 1980b ). Lukacs, like Bourdieu, postulates an important mediating factor between a writer's class position and the nature of the work. But his mediating factor is not a static, reproducing habitus but the dynamic, historical struggle of classes for liberation.
Lukacs postulates that the interests of a writer's class position impose cognitive limits on his or her productions, but the nature of these interests is determined by the class's changing relation to humanity's progressive struggles for freedom. So, for example, he argues that the narrative style of bourgeois realists like Balzac, Dickens, and Tolstoy, which depicts reality as a historical creation of the strivings of human beings, is the consequence of the bourgeoisie's progressive struggles against the feudal order in the formative stages of capitalism. Because at this time the bourgeoisie was engaged in the struggle against feudalism-a struggle that served not only its particular interest but the general interest of stant reminders of class gaps. Second, nonmaterial cultural pursuits require extensive training, either formal or informal, in skills of consumption, which is generally denied the working class.
So advanced capitalist societies possess both a mass material and class nonmaterial culture. And the two realms of culture working in unison do a much better job of legitimating and reproducing the class structure than either could separately. In leisure, people consume homogenized material products, which provide the cultural basis for rituals of classobscuring solidarity. When people of different classes meet at leisure, they can talk the common language of consumerism and feel very much at one with each other. However, at the same time the dominant class distinguishes itself by cultivating a separate realm of nonmaterial culture, which provides the cultural basis for rituals of exclusion. Only the bourgeoisie can talk art, classical music, and literature, thus excluding and subordinating the workers they command at work in rituals testifying to superior knowledge and learning ability. 
